




The recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the liquor cases, J1ugl/er v. Kansas, and Kansa v.
Ziebold(i887 ), 123 U. S. 623, and Kiddv. Pearson (1888), 128
Id. i ; and in the oleomargarine cases, Powell v. Pennsylvania,
and Walker v. Pennsylvania (1888), 127 Id. 178, are of much
interest to constitutional lawyers, as indicating the wide scope of
the legal functions of government by the States. The first three
of these cases decided that statutes prohibitory of the manu-
facture and sale of intoxicating drinks, except for certain special
purposes, did not contravene any provisions of the Constitution
of the United States. The other cases ruled that a statute of
Pennsylvania, which absolutely prohibited the manufacture and
sale of oleomargarine throughout the State, was not unconst:-
tutional.
The constitutional provision invoked by the assailants of the
statutes in question was the familiar injunction of the first sec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." The contention before the court was
chiefly confined to the latter part of the section in question,
namely, to the inhibition on a State's deprivation of liberty or
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property without due process of law, and on its denial of the
equal protection of the laws. The earlier provision, against a
State's abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, received a construction in the Slaughter House
Cases (1872), i6 Wall. 36, which practically eliminated it from
discussions relating to the power of the States, as governments,
to legislate concerning their own citizens. A distinction was
there for the first time made, judicially, between citizenship in
the State and in the United States [see 27 AMERICAN LAw
REGISTER, "Citizens "], and the privileges or immunities within
the protection of the earlier portion of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were confined to those which arise out of the nature and
essential character of the national government, the provisions
of the Constitution, or its laws and treaties made in pursuance
thereof. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, of protec-
tion while on the high seas or within a foreign government, of
the use of the navigable waters of the United States, and the
like, were named as instances of such immunities. The funda-
mental rights of the individual as such-the right to acquire
property and pursue happiness without molestation-were
declared to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the
States, and, as such, without the sphere of the protection of the
clause under consideration. The definite protection of the
Federal Constitution against State interference with the citizen's
fundamental rights, from the time of this decision, has accord-
ingly been sought in the later provisions of the section, where
the States are prohibited from taking life, liberty or property
without due process of law, 'and from denying to persons
within their respective jurisdictions the equal protection of the
laws.
The significance of the liquor and oleomargarine cases
referred to is in the extent to which they have recognized the
broad functions of the States, as governments, to legislate
concerning their own internal affairs, without antagonizing
these specific restraints upon the impairment of individual
rights.
The six cases known as the Granger Cases (1876), begin-
ning with Munn v. Illinois and ending with Stone v. Wisconsin,
reported in 94 U. S. pp. 113 to 187, marked an era in the
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constitutional law of the land. They asserted, and applied
new conditions, the principle of the common law, that, where
private property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to State
regulation in respect to the rates or charges for such use im-
posed upon the public by the owner. The court, in the leading
case of Menn v. Illinois, upon this principle, sustained a State
law fixing a maximum of charges for the storage of grain in
warehouses in Chicago and elsewhere in Illinois. The other
decisions declared the validity of State laws, fixing a maximum
rate for transportation of freight and passengers on certain
railways. The inhibition of the Fourteenth Amendment against
the deprivation of property, without due process of law, was
held as of operative effect upon private property only, and not
upon property affected with a public interest, as that of public
warehousemen and common carriers. It was said in the first
of these cases, however, that, even as to property which was
strictlyjuris privati, the right of regulation of its use and of the
price of its use always existed, the only effect of the Amend-
ment, as to it, being to prevent the State from regulation to
the extent of deprivation. The special significance of the
Granger Cases is, that in them the Supreme Court, for the first
time since the adoption of the latest amendment to the Consti-
tution, directed marked attention to the sccpe of the State's
sovereign powers affecting the liberty of the individual, and
affirmed the existence of broad and wide powers of legislation.
Two different and, in some respects, antithetical forces or
tendencies are noticeable in the development of the law of con-
stitutional limitations upon the States. The first is what might
be called the centripetal tendency, or tendency towards the
emphasis of the Federal, rather than the State, functions of
legislation under our dual systems of government, State and
National. This tendency prominently appears through all the
years of the formative period of our body of constitutional law.
Marshall and his associates were making the nation. A con-
stitution framed in a time of weakness, for the purpose of
welding together into one sovereignty a number of independent
autonomies, was being tested. If the new government was to
live and grow strong in the midst of thriving commonwealths,•
it was necessary that the powers given to it should be liberally,
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.construed in accordance with the purpose of those who called
it into being. Accordingly, a series of decisions, great in the
principles they declared, and far-reaching in their effect upon
our national life, early put beyond the reach of successful
assault the doctrine of the supremacy of the Federal govern-
ment. Many of these decisions, as McCullock v. Maryland
(1819), 4 Wheat. 316; Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 9 Id. I ; and
Brown v. J'faryland (1827), 12 Id. 419, directly discussed the
relations between Federal and State authority. Of the first of
them William Pinckney said, "It is a pledge of the immortality
of the Union." Other decisions, as Fletcher v. leck (18 1o), 6
Cr. 87, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 Wheat.
5 18, concerned only the relations of the individual to the State,
in the light of the Federal limitations upon the State, as con-
tained in the Constitution of the United States. The latter,
however, as effectually as the former, tended to the dominance
of National power, by declaring the value to the citizen of the
United States, of the specific limitations upon State action which
the National Constitution established.
But through all this period of development of the nation, as
well as later, there was full recognition of the State's broad
governmental functions. This is particularly noticeable in New
York v. Miln (1837), Ii Pet. 102, and The License Cases (1847),
5 How. 5o4. These cases were decided by a court constituted
very differently from that of the period of the dominance of
Marshall and Story. But its utterances, in so far as they con-
sider the scope of State legislative power, unaffected by the
grant of power to the United States, are wholly in accord with
those of the earlier time.
The court in New York v. Miln stated these as impregnable
positions: That a State has the same undeniable, unlimited
jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial
limits as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not sur-
rendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United
States; that, by virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the
bounden and solemn duty of a State to advance the safety,
happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its
general welfare by any and every act of legislation which it
may deem to be conducive to those ends, where the power
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over the particular subject or the manner of its exercise, is not
surrendered or restrained in the manner just stated.
Upon the general question of the extent of the grant of
power to the Federal government, the decision in the Pas-
senger Cases (I849), 7 How. 283, is perhaps more satisfactory
than the opinion in this case, and more in accord with the law
as laid down by the great Federalist judges, who gave to the
Supreme Court its early character. But no dissent is possible
from the statement of the law made by Mr. Justice BARBOUR in
New York v. Ain, regarded as an expression of the principles
of government by the State, when unaffected by the limitations
of the Federal constitution.
Notwithstanding these views as to the extent of State power,
the great struggle for the first seventy years of our national
life was for supremacy of the Nation over the State. This
supremacy was secured in its amplest form, and with the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment the Federal Constitution
became more than ever, a thing of dignity and worth, by whose
words the validity of every action of a State or its officers
might be tested.
The Supreme Court, as constituted since the civil war, has
faithfully maintained, and indeed extended, the National prin-
ciple. In lidlliard v. Greenman (1883), i1O U. S. 421, the
latest Legal Tender case, it has affirmed the power of Congress
to make the treasury notes of the United States a legal tender
in payment of private debts, in time of peace as well as in time
of war. It has stricken down State laws, otherwise clearly
within the power of the State to enact, because they trespassed,
though never so slightly, upon the grant of power to the Fed-
eral government. The many instances where State tax or
police laws directly affecting interstate commerce have been
overturned, are in point. Philadelphia Steamshp Company v.
Pennsylvania (I886), 122 U. S. 326; Western Union Telegraph
Company v. Pendleton (i 886), Id. 347, and Bowman v. Chizcago
and Northwestern Railway Company (1887), .25 U. S. 465, are
very recent cases in illustration.
The development of industrial and commercial activities has
been so great during the last twenty years, and there has been
such a growing necessity, because of the complex social and
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business life of the people, for the exercise of governmental
functions by the States, that we would naturally expect that
more particular attention would have to be given by the courts
to the State's powers under our scheme of* government. The
present era, therefore, while showing no relinquishment or
abatement of the nation's acknowledged claim to an undivided
sovereignty within the sphere of its grant of powers, has been
eminently fruitful of inquiry into the scope of the State's func-
tions.
It is the era of the centrifugal tendency.
The Granger Cases were the first marked expression of this
tendency under the new conditions. It is said that, when
Munn v. Illinois was first considered in conference by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, it was agreed that the particular
exercise of legislative power there attempted was clearly un-
constitutional. It was remarked by one of the justices, who
afterwards saw no objection to the act on constitutional
grounds, that the legislature might as well prescribe by law the
price he should pay his tailor for his coat, as to pass an act of
that kind. See Paper of James K. Edsall, in Reports of Ameri-
can Bar Association, 1887, pp. 288, 298.
The Supreme Court of the United States not only sustained
the law then under consideration, but has since gone far
towards making the sartorial figure of the Illinois justice some-
thing more serious than a jest. It is possible the Court may
yet say, not only that the price of coats may be fixed by law,
but that the propriety of wearing coats at all may be deter-
mined by the legislature. Since the decision in Powell v.
Pennsylvania (the soundness of which is not here questioned),
it is difficult to tell, in advance, at what point the Court will
stop the exercise of the discretion of the legislature of a
State, when the occasion for legislating at all upon the
subject exists.
The latest statement by the Supreme Court of the law of the
particular questions discussed in the Granger Cases is found
in Dow v. Beidelman (1887), 125 U. S. 68o. From that case
it will be seen that the State legislatures may regulate the
charges of public corporations to any extent, short of confis-
cation of their property. And the Court will not let "water"
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pass for money, in determining whether any particular act
reducing the charges, and consequently the income, of corpora-
tions, works a confiscation of their property by impairing their
dividend-earning or interest-earning capacity.
The history of the liquor cases is familiar. Bartemeyer v.
Iowa (1873), 18 Wall. 129, was the first of the series decided
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
passed upon the Iowa prohibitory law of 185 I, sustaining it as
a proper legislative measure, within the State's comprehensive
police powers. It appeared that the specific liquor in question
was not shown to have been owned by the defendant before
the passage of the law, and the Court declared that there was
no protection for him in the Fourteenth Amendment. In the
opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice MILLER, it was said, however,
that if the question were fairly before the Court that the glass
of liquor was in existence at the time the State of Iowa first
imposed an absolute prohibition on the sale of such liquors,
two very grave questions would arise, namely, First, Whether
this would be a statute depriving him of his property without
due process of law; and, Secondly, whether, if it were so, it
would be so far a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
that regard, as would call for judicial action by the Court.
These expressions of doubt as to the possible extent of State
power in dealing with the subject matter were repeated in the
next case of the kind, Beer Company v. Jl1assac/usatts (I877),
97 U. S. 25-32. The point decided in that case was that no
charter right to manufacture intoxicants could protect against
the subsequent prohibition of all such business. But the Court
was careful to express no opinion as to whether liquor actually
in existence when the law was passed or took effect, was sub-
ject to practical destruction at the hands of the State, without
compensation.
In Foster v. Kansas (1884), 112 U. S. 201, the Court re-
affirmed the doctrines of Bartenzeyerv. Iowa and Beer Company
v. iAfassaehtusetts.
In Jlzq/hgler v. Kansas, supra, the whole general question
came before the court upon facts requiring the determination
of the points considered doubtful in the earlier cases. Mugler
was indicted under a rigid prohibitory act, passed February
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ig, 1881, which took effect May i, 1881. One of the counts
'in the indictment was directed against his sale, after the act
took effect, of liquor manufactured by him before its passage.
The decision, which was rendered by Mr. Justice HARLAN, in
a very comprehensive way established the State's right to
legislate so as to deprive of value the liquor actually in exist-
ence before the passage of the act.
Another point, not definitely raised in the previous cases,
was also raised and decided here, namely, whether the law's
impairment in, or deprivation of, value of property, real and
personal, adapted chiefly or solely for brewery purposes, was
a taking without due process. The lower courts had been
divided in opinion. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Kansas
v. Afugler (1883), 29 Kan. 252, and the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Northern District of Georgia, in
Weil v. Calhozn (1885), 25 Fed. Rep. 865, had sustained the
State's power to pass such laws; whereas, Judge BREWER,
of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District
of Kansas, had held in State v. Walruff (1886), 26 Fed.
Rep. 178, and in the Ziebold Case (1886), that such a law
was a clear invasion of individual rights of property. The
Supreme Court held that all such property rights must give
way, or rather that they did not exist, before the State's
sovereign right, under its police power, to protect the health,
morals and general welfare of the people. The court said
(p. 669): "The power which the States have, of prohibiting
such use (for certain forbidden purposes) by individuals, of their
property, as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the
safety of the public, is not, and, consistently with the existence and
safety of organized society, cannot, be burdened with the con-
dition that the State must compensate such individual owners
for pecuniary losses they may sustain by reason of their not
being permitted by a noxious use of their property to inflict
injury upon the community. The exercise of the police power,
by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance,
or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its
value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking prop-
erty for public use, or from depriving a person of his property
without due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance is
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abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away from
an innocent owner."
It was objected in Kansas v. Ziebold, supra, decided with
the Mugler case, that the legislature could not arbitrarily
declare that to be a common nuisance which had theretofore
been recognized by the law, and wipe out of existence bona
fide investments, made upon the faith of such recognition.
The court answered: "The statute is prospective in its
operation, that is, it does not put the brand of a common
nuisance upon any place, unless, after its passage, that place
is kept and maintained for purposes declared by the legislature
to be injurious ta the community." This decision declared
legal the confiscation and absolute destruction, by the court
officers, of the glasses, bottles and other property of the kind
in liquor establishments, after the law went into effect. It
also took away, perhaps, nine-tenths of the value of the
machinery and fixtures used in the manufacture and sale of
the prohibited articles.
Finally, in Kidd v. Pearson, supra, all the doctrines of
Mflugler v. Kansas and Kansas v. Ziebold were restated and
reaffirmed.
The difference between the Granger Cases and the Liquor
Cases is, that in the former cases the right of State regulation
of a public business was extended to limiting the prices to be
charged in conducting it, while, in the latter, the right of abso-
lute destruction of the business and of the value of the property
invested in it was recognized. The latter cases were therefore
a very material advance upon the former.
The extension of the State's power over the property and
occupations of its citizens, in these cases, was of course made
with reference to the particular facts before the Court-the
grave and serious menace of the liquor traffic to the public
interests, and the common knowledge of the demoralization of
the people from the excessive use of intoxicants.
The court, however, did not stop at the liquor cases. Within
a few months of the decision in Mugler v. Kansas came that of
Powell v. Pennsylvania, supra, wherein the State was declared
competent to prohibit the manufacture and sale of oleomargar-
ine, to take from the manufacturer his property by depriving it
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of all value, and from the seller, as well as the manufacturer,
his business, by enjoining him from continuing in it. Large
investments were shown to have been made in machinery
specially adapted for the manufacture of the prohibited article,
and valuable only as old iron with the la-w in force. It was
held the State's arm could not be stayed by the requirement
that compensation be made for this loss.
The fundamental right to pursue a lawful calling was insisted
upon in argument against the law. The Court answered that
the right to pursue ordinary callings or trades and to acquire,
hold, and sell property is suLservient to the State's right,
through the legislature, to protect the public health and
morals. It was declared to be entirely a matter of legislative
discretion, what measures to take, to remedy or remove, a par-
ticular evil which seemed to exist; the only qualification being,
that an act of legislation having no possible relation to the
objects sought by the legislation, could not be sustained. The
Court was unable to declare, in the face of the recognized pre-
sumptions in favor of the bone fides of acts of the legislature,
that the traffic in oleomargarine was not an injury to the public,
or that the legislature, in forbidding it, did not intend to
remedy what it deemed, and what was, a public evil.
These cases came to the Supreme Court, as did the liquor
cases, with judgments of the lower courts opposed to each
other on the questions in dispute. The Court of Appeals of
New York had, in People v. 31a-x (1885), 99 N. Y. 377, held
such laws to be unconstitutional, as unwarrantably interfering
with the liberty of the citizen. The Supreme Court of Missouri,
in State v. Addington (1882), 77 Mo. IiO, and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the cases under review, had sustained
them.
The distinct advance here made upon previous adjudications
of the kind, was in the affirmance of the right of the State
absolutely to deprive of all value and to destroy property con-
nected with a business which was not clearly and unmistakably
inimical to the interests of the public.
The latitude that was here given to the legislature, to declare
not only the extent to which it will exercise its power of re-
dressing a conceded public wrong, but also to declare the
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existence of the wrong to be redressed, makes these last cases
advanced landmarks of the State's governmental power affect-
ing individual rights.
That the decisions are sound and right is not questioned by
the writer, although the principle upon which they were ruled
has met with disapproval by at least one eminent writer on
constitutional law: See 2 Hare's American Constitutional
Law, 773-776 (1889). It seems more in accordance with the
American theory of popular government through representa-
tives, that the legislature, rather than the courts, should
determine questions of public policy as to the possession of
property and the exercise of personal liberty. The courts, it
is true, are the conservators of individual rights protected by
the constitution. But they are not to set up their own theory
of government, outside of the written constitutions, and test
legislative acts by that theory. In a complex social system,
such as ours is getting to be, the tendency necessarily must be
towards affirmative exercise of governmental powers. The
clashing of diverse individual interests is anarchical in ten-
dency.
A laissez faire democracy is not a practical democracy.
Sixty millions of people must have laws. When interests
clash and laws are demanded, the practical question is, not
whether a State may act by its legislature for the purpose of
declaring or redressing a wrong, but whether it is prohibited
from so acting. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
the decisions considered, has merely given the benefit of the
doubt to the State, rather than to the individual; to the people,
rather than to the person.
The limit to State action that is insisted upon by that court
is stated and illustrated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1885), 118 U.
S. 356, 369, where the Court said: "When we conzider the
nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the prin-
ciples upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the
history of their development, we are constrained to conclude
that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action
of purely personal and arbitrary power." In this case a muni-
cipal ordinance of California, which made it possible for the
city authorities, whose duty it was to license laundrymen, to
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withhold licenses from persons of a certain race, arbitrarily and
without reference to the qualifications of applicants, was held
to be clearly within the inhibition of the constitution. See
Dent v. West Vl,-inia (1889), 129 U. S. 114, 124, where this
principle is very recently recognized.
The broad sovereignty of the State within the Nation, thus
recognized, is the true State sovereignty of the Constitution.
It was left for great justices of the Federalist school to declare
these "State rights" as legitimately belonging in our system
of government.
Calhoun and the doctrinaires of his school would have
erected the State upon the ruins of the Nation. Had they
succeeded, they could have built no fairer structure than that
which has since been raised by those whose theories they
condemned. The phrase "State sovereignty" has been rescued
from its friends, and given its true meaning in our governmental
scheme.
"Defamed by every charlatan
And soil'd with all ignoble use,"
its legitimately wide scope has been declared, and its rightful
domain established. It is the best tribute to the genius of
HAMIL'ON and MARSHALL, that a government of their creation,
after achieving its own promised destiny of strength and vigor,
should be able, through its courts, to declare, and by its arm to
enforce, that comprehensive sovereignty of the States which
belonged as essentially in their system as that of the supremacy
of National authority itself. There was needed the triumph of
their principle of nationality, before the principle of sovereign
statehood could be broadly declared and worked out.
A. H. WINTERSTEE N.
Philadelphia.
